It is clear that the laws of logic cannot themselves obey further logical laws.

(There is not, as Russell supposed, for every "type" a special law of contradiction;
but one is sufficient, since it is not applied to itself.)

6.1231
The mark of logical propositions is *not* their general validity

To be general is only to be accidentally valid for all things.
An ungeneralized proposition can be tautologous just as well as a generalized one.

6.1232
Logical general validity, we could call essential as opposed to accidental general validity, e.g. of the proposition "all men are mortal".
Propositions like Russell's "axiom of reducibility" are not logical propositions,
and this explains our feeling that, if true, they can only be true by a happy chance.

6.1233
We can imagine a world in which the axiom of reducibility is not valid.
But it is clear that logic has nothing to do with the question whether our world is really of this kind or not.