Wherever the word "object" ("thing", "entity", etc.) is rightly used, it is expressed in logical symbolism by the variable name.

For example in the proposition "there are two objects which ...", by
"(x,y)...".

Wherever it is used otherwise, i.e. as a proper concept word, there arise senseless pseudo-propositions.

So one cannot, e.g. say "There are objects" as one says "There are books". Nor "There are 100 objects" or "There are
_{0}** **objects".

And it is senseless to speak of *the number of all objects*.

The same holds of the words "Complex", "Fact", "Function", "Number", etc.

They all signify formal concepts and are presented in logical symbolism by variables, not by functions or classes. (As Frege and Russell thought.)

Expressions like "1 is a number", "there is only one number nought", and all like them are senseless.

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The formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it.
One cannot, therefore, introduce both, the objects which fall under a formal concept *and* the formal concept itself, as primitive ideas.
One cannot, therefore, e.g. introduce (as Russell does) the concept of function and also special functions as primitive ideas;
or the concept of number and definite numbers.